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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW 
The following is a complete list of all the parties in the proceedings before the Fourth 
District Court, State of Utah, Utah County, Orem Department: 
The Honorable John C. Backlund, Judge, Presiding. 
The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented on appeal by Robert J. Church. 
The defendant, Edward Joseph Gallagher, represented by Michael J. Petro. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 as Amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court, as a matter of law, correctly find that the initial encounter 
between Officer Warenski and the appellant was a level one stop? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies. The trial court's underlying fact findings 
are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial court's 
conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of 
discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See State v. Pena , 
869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Moreno , 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), 
cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was found guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44 (1953 as Amended) as adopted by Orem City 
ordinance. At the suppression hearing, counsel for appellant proffered the testimony of 
appellee's citizen witness, Mr. Medina, as well as the arresting officer, Officer Warenski. 
At the March 29, 2004 bench trial, appellant was found guilty. Appellant was sentenced 
on April 14,2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellee generally agrees with appellant's statement of the facts with the following 
additions and/or exceptions. 
1. The City allowed appellant's counsel to proffer the citizen witnesses testimony 
stating, "I think since you've spoken to Mr. Medina if you, I trust you to do that accurately 
to what Mr. Medina saw." R. 166, lines 14-16. This occurred because the attorney 
representing the City at this hearing stepped in at the last minute to cover this hearing for 
the original charging attorney and had not had the opportunity to adequately interview all 
the witnesses. 
2. When the time came for the proffer of Officer Warenski's testimony, appellant's 
counsel stated, "I think I can proffer." R. 163, line 15. 
3. In appellant's proffer, counsel indicated that Officer Warenski received 
dispatched information regarding a green Ford Mustang. No plate number was given. 
Appellant proffered that dispatch did not list any particular area of Orem to look for the 
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Mustang. R. 163, lines 17-24. However, at R.162, lines 14-17, it was clarified by the City 
that Officer Warenski was told that the driver was possibly eastbound on University 
Parkway. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The City will not contest appellant's argument that based on the facts contained in 
the proffer that no reasonable suspicion existed for Officer Warenski to detain appellant. 
However, since this was a level one stop, reasonable suspicion was not required. No 
seizure of the appellant took place and there are no facts to support that argument. The 
only facts before the Court are that Officer Warenski was dispatched to be on the lookout 
for a green Ford Mustang traveling eastbound on University Parkway. The facts then 
indicate that Officer Warenski located a green Ford Mustang in the north part of a parking 
lot, that he parked behind the vehicle in a "T" configuration, activated his spot-light on the 
vehicle and approached the driver's window. 
There are no facts indicating that this was a confrontational encounter. There are 
no facts indicating that the officer was accompanied by other officers, that he displayed a 
weapon, that there was any physical touching of the appellant, that the officer's language 
or tone of voice were confrontational, that he was discourteous in any way, that the 
appellant objected to the encounter or any other facts to support anything more than a 
voluntary encounter between a police officer and a citizen. 
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Because these facts are missing, the only conclusion to be drawn from this 
encounter is that it was a level one encounter. As such, reasonable suspicion was not 
required. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN OFFICER WARENSKI AND 
THE APPELLANT WAS A LEVEL ONE STOP, NOT REQUIRING 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, 
The City does not contest the argument that the facts supplied by appellant's 
counsel at the suppression hearing do not give rise to reasonable suspicion. However, 
since this was a level one stop, reasonable suspicion was not necessary. 
Officer Warenski came upon a green Ford Mustang parked in the north area of a 
parking lot. R. 161, line 6. By illuminating the area, his actions constituted a prudent 
safety measure before approaching the car. R 162, line 5, 6. See State v. Justesen, 47 P.3d 
936 (2002 Utah App.), United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269, 272 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 
U.S. 1095 (1991) ("A law enforcement agent faced with the possibility of danger, has a 
right to take reasonable steps to protect himself [or herself].. . ."). The officer's ensuing 
encounter with defendant thus began not as a seizure, but as a "level one," or non-seizure, 
police-citizen encounter. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)). 
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A. There Are No Indicia of Seizure Present During the Initial Level One 
Police-Citizen Encounter Here. 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct 1868 (1968), and its progeny, there are three levels of 
police-citizen encounters. Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. The first level is a non-seizure which 
occurs when, as here, an officer approaches and questions a suspect. "[A] seizure within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police officer merely 
approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the person is willing to listen." 
Id. (citation omitted). The second level is reached when an officer temporarily seizes a 
person "'by means of physical force or show of authority'" which '"'in some way 
restraints] the liberty of a person.5" Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 552 (1980). In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have 
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime, and 
the detention must be limited in scope. Id. Because the question here is whether the 
instant encounter escalated from a voluntary encounter to a seizure, as a matter of law, 
when the officer activated his spot light, only these first two levels ctre critical to the 
analysis.1 
A seizure occurs when, "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he 
was not at liberty to ignore police presence and go about his business." Florida v. Bostick, 
*The third level is arrest, which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a 
crime has been or is about to be committed. Id. 
5 
501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). In Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, the United States Supreme 
Court discussed examples of circumstances "that might indicate a seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave." They include the following: 
the threatening presence of several officers, 
• the display of a weapon by an officer, 
• some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with 
the officer's request might be compelled. 
Id. None of these indicia are present here. 
It is undisputed that the appellant had no physical obstruction in front of his vehicle 
that would have prevented him from leaving. R.162, lines 22-25, R. 161, lines 1-13. Only 
one officer was present at the scene, no weapon was drawn, no touching of the appellant 
took place nor is there any indication as to the language or tone of voice used. R. 163, 
lines 17-25, R. 162, lines 1-25, R. 161, lines 1-13. 
Appellant erroneously argues that a seizure occurred when the officer activated his 
spot light. The light activated by the officer was not the familiar red and blue flashing 
lights, but was in the nature of a spotlight on the officer's vehicle which had the effect of 
illuminating the surrounding immediate area. Illuminating the area is not a show of force. 
J u s t e d 47 P.3d at 939. 
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B. Illumination is an Eminently Reasonable Safety Precaution and Does 
Not By Itself Amount to a Show of Authority, Let Alone Seizure, for 
Fourth Amendment Purposes. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long 
recognized that illumination is often necessary so that police can see to investigate; 
consequently, illumination by itself does not amount to a search. United States v. Lee, 21A 
U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of a searchlight held not to constitute a search within meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah) (holding use of flashlight 
to view automobile's interior constitutional), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). 
Here, illumination was also necessary for the officer's safety2. Appellant argues 
that there "was not one iota of evidence that the officer needed take-down lights to 
illuminate a parking area in a mall parking lot..." See Appellant's Brief at 21. There is, 
however, no evidence to suggest that Officer Warenski did not need the additional 
illumination. Also, the proffer does not indicate that this was a "mall" parking lot that 
might be illuminated. The proffer simply states that this stop took place "toward the north 
area of the parking lot." R. 161, line 5 6. 
2
 Appellant states that the stop took place at forty-six minutes after midnight. See 
Appellant's Brief at 19. In fact, the proffer is silent as to the time of day or night this 
encounter took place. R. 161-166. The only fact alluding to an after-sundown encounter 
was the fact that Officer Warenski activated his spotlight. R. 162, line 5. The City 
acknowledges that Officer Warenski reported making contact with the appellant at 12:15 a.m., 
although there are no facts in the proffer to support this fact and would dispute a claim that the 
encounter took place at 12:46 a.m.. 
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As noted previously, police faced with the possibility of danger have a right to take 
reasonable steps to protect themselves. See Merkley, 988 F.2d at 1064. Officer 
Warenski's objective safety concern was real and reasonable. The United States Supreme 
Court has consistently recognized the danger facing police in these circumstances. In 
Marylandv. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 
1994 alone, there were 5,672 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits 
and stops." The Supreme Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police 
shootings occur when an officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
234 n.5 (1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-
month period were killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while 
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer 
shootings occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has been 
made). As tragically highlighted by recent events in this state, Utah law enforcement is 
not immune from the national trend. See Pat Christian, Details Shed Light on Gunfight, 
Daily Herald, August 7, 2001, (a copy is attached as Addendum, Exhibit "1"). See also 
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffif 2-5, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000) (passenger in traffic stop 
shot at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. Johnson, 784 
P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as officer approached 
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vehicle). Given the grim statistics, this Court should be "loathe to create a situation in 
which officers would be discouraged from acting to help stranded motorists, from acting in 
the interest of safety of the traveling public, or from acting in the interest of their own 
safety." State v. Baldonado, 847 P.2d 751, 753 (N.M. App. 1993), cert, denied, 848 P.2d 
531 (N.M. 1993). Although this was not a "vehicle stop," the same potential for danger 
exists. 
Moreover, the City is unaware of any authority holding that illumination of an area 
by police with stationary white light, by itself, constituted a show of authority sufficient to 
constitute a seizure. Rather, police action in illuminating an area with a spotlight, without 
an explicit verbal order to "stop," and/or otherwise blocking the suspect, is insufficient to 
constitute a seizure. United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 1084-1085 (8th Cir.), cert 
denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991). See also State v. Hunter, 783 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. App. 
1990) (rejecting defendant's claim that he was seized the moment police pulled up behind 
his car and activated take-down lights); State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681, 688 (Wash. 1998) 
(holding that illumination by a spotlight did not amount to a show of authority for 
purposes of seizure, where the officer did not have his siren or emergency lights on and 
did not draw his weapon); State v. O'Neill, 17 P.3d 682, 689-690 (Wash. App. 2001) 
(finding no seizure where officer did not activate his emergency lights, draw his weapon, 
or block defendant's access out of the parking lot). Cf State v. Brechlin, All N.W.2d 367, 
369 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that activation of "flashing red lights and 'take-down' 
lights" constituted seizure). 
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While there is case support for the fact that "red lights," State v. Carpena, 714 P,2d 
674, 675 (Utah 1986), "a flashing red light," Malina v. Gonzalez, 99 A F.2d 1121, 1123, 
1126 (5th Cir. 1993), "flashing lights and siren," Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 11 (1st Cir. 
1993), or "flashing lights and continuing pursuit," Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 
597 (1989), constitute a show of authority similar to an explicit verbal command, 
California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 628-629 (1991), they do not necessarily indicate 
seizure. Indeed, HodariD. clarifies that a seizure does not occur if the subject does not 
yield to the show of authority. Id. at 626. Cf. Baldonado, 847 P.2d at 753 (recognizing 
there are circumstances in which people in stopped cars approached by officers flashing 
their lights would be free to leave because the officers would be simply communicating 
with them to ascertain that they are not in trouble. . . the officers may well activate their 
emergency lights for reasons of highway safety or so as not to unduly alarm the stopped 
motorists"). In any event, appellant has not argued, nor was it proffered that Officer 
Warenski activated his red and blue flashing emergency lights or siren, thus, no 
circumstance giving rise to a show of authority, let alone seizure, is present here. 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1997), is consistent with the above 
authority and does not support the appellant's erroneous argument of a seizure on these 
facts. While this Court found that a seizure did occur in Struhs, the officer's use of high-
beam headlights and white take-down lights were not the sole indicia of seizure in that 
case. Id. at 1228. Rather, applying the totality of the circumstances, the Court's 
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determination of seizure was also based on the Struhs officer's stealth and confrontational 
conduct; in particular, the Struhs officer turned off her lights before pulling "nose-to-nose" 
with Struh's vehicle and then suddenly activated her high-beam headlights and white take-
down lights. Id. Given these circumstances, it is not at all clear that the Court would have 
found a seizure if the Struhs officer had approached in a non-confrontational manner 
similar to the officer in this case. Compare State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1989) (finding seizure where officer blocked the defendant's vehicle). 
Just as Struhs is distinguishable from the instant facts, so is State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 
9 (Utah App. 1991), upon which Struhs relies. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228. The Court's 
opinion in Davis does not clarify whether the "overhead lights" in Davis were stationary 
white lights, red and blue flashing emergency lights, or both. Davis, 821 P.2d at 12. ("The 
officer then detained Davis by a display of authority when he activated the overhead lights 
on his vehicle."). However, this Court can take judicial notice that the "overhead lights" 
in Davis were in fact red and blue flashing emergency lights because that was the Davis 
officer's suppression hearing testimony. See Davis, Case No. 910166-Ca, Aplt. Br. at 
addendum, p. 6, lines 3, 4 (the pertinent pages of the brief and addendum are attached as 
Addendum, Exhibit "2"). See also Utah R. Evid. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . .capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). 
The Davis officer's use of his red and blue flashing emergency "overhead lights" is 
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consistent with his intent to detain Davis for possible open container or D.U.I, violations. 
Id. at 12. Here, on the other hand, there are no facts to suggest if Officer Warenski even 
knew if the Mustang was occupied or abandoned when he illuminated the parking lot area 
and vehicle with his spot light. The proffer is silent as to whether the appellant was sitting 
upright, leaning over in his vehicle, reclining, etc., when Officer Warenski pulled 
perpendicular to appellant's vehicle and activated his light. R. 162, lines 5-8. 
Thus, at most appellant was arguably startled by the officer's activation of the 
illuminating spot light, but that does not mean that a reasonable person would feel, under 
the totality of the circumstances, that he or she was not free to leave. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
435; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. Indeed, appellant was parked before the officer came upon 
the vehicle and illuminated the area. And there is no evidence that the officer otherwise 
sought to detain appellant R. 160-163. The officer did not activate his flashing 
emergency red and blue lights, did not park so as to block the Mustang in any manner, and 
did not, once he became aware the Mustang was occupied, order appellant to stay put. 
R160-163. Rather, the fact that appellant's attorney failed to mention anything about it 
would suggest that the officer approached the Mustang in a non-threatening manner, 
without a displayed weapon or tone of voice indicating compliance might be compelled, 
nor did he touch appellant. R 160-163 See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. 
Appellant's arguments trying to show a seizure are not supported by the facts. In 
attempting to show that there was some sort of confrontational approach, appellant argues 
12 
that the Officer "aggressively search[ed]" for the Ford Mustang. See Appellant's Brief at 
20. There are no facts in the proffer to support this argument. R. 163, lines 17-25, R. 162, 
lines 1-3. Appellant further argues that the officer pulled behind him in a 
"confrontational manner." See Appellant's Brief at 20. Again the proffer does not support 
this conclusion. All that was proffered was that the officer pulled behind and "T"['d] off 
to the appellant's vehicle, with appellant being able to pull forward. R. 162, lines 22-25, 
R. 161, lines 1-7. This is clearly not confrontational. (The officer parking nose-to-nose 
with defendant's vehicle was confrontational.) Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228. Finally, to state 
that "the officer did not approach the vehicle in a courteous way" has no basis of fact in 
the proffer. See Appellant's Brief at 21. R. 162, lines 5-11. 
Thus, no indicia of seizure are present here and the argument that the mere 
activation of the spot light escalated an otherwise voluntary police-citizen encounter to a 
Fourth Amendment seizure would be erroneous. Justesen, 47 P.3d at 939. "If an officer 
merely walks up to a person...who is seated in a vehicle located in a public place...and puts 
a question to him, this alone does not constitute a seizure." Id. citing 4 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 9.3 (3d. ed. 1996). To force an officer to choose between personal 
safety and illuminating an area or not stop to render assistance, or even investigate is an 
untenable position. Justesen, 47 P.3d at 939. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, there are no recognized indicia of seizure here. Therefore, the 
encounter between Officer Warenski and appellant was a voluntary, level one stop. The 
appellant's appeal should be denied as this was a level one encounter between a citizen 
and police officer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February, 2005. 
ROBERT J. CHURCH 
Orem City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellee's Brief, postage prepaid, this 18th day of February, 2005, to the following: 
Michael J. Petro 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo,UT 84601 
14 
ADDENDUM 
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EXHIBIT " 1 " 
Pat Christian, Details Shed Light on Gunflght, Daily Herald, 
August 7, 2001 
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Details shed light on gunfight 
By PAT CHRISTIAN 
The Daily Herald 
PROVO — Police and prosecutors released new information 
Monday about the gunfight that left Lehi Police Officer Joseph 
Adams dead and suspect Arturo Javier Scott Welch in critical 
condition. 
Prosecutors said they planned to go before 4th District Court 
Judge Guy Burnmgham early today with a probable-cause 
statement charging Welch, of West Valley City 
Around 10:30 p.m Friday, Adams stopped a vehicle, driven by 
Welch, at 2100 N 1200 West, Lehi. 
"Officer Joseph Adams approached Arturo's vehicle and 
requested a driver's license, registration and insurance 
information, " Sheriff's spokesman Sgt. Dennis Harris said. The 
suspect, who had a passenger in the car with him, was stopped 
on suspicion of drunken driving. 
"According to a witness, a large amount of alcohol had been 
consumed that evening by both occupants, " Harris said. 
Adams then had Welch step outside the car, with the passenger 
still inside the vehicle. At some point, Adams recovered a 
controlled drug from the suspect. 
Adams had handcuffed the suspect's left hand, placing him 
under arrest, when the man allegedly pulled away and began 
shooting at him with a small-caliber handgun, Harris said. 
"The bullet missed Officer Joseph Adams' body armor and 
entered into his chest, " Harris said. 
Adams returned fire. 
"The passenger of the vehicle exited the vehicle when he heard 
a weapon being fired and laid on the ground, " Harris said. 
John Allan, deputy prosecutor, confirmed that a gun had been 
recovered. 
The suspect was found in the parking lot of an Albertson's in 
Salt Lake County, where Welch collapsed after exiting his car. 
"You can be shot in non-vital areas, like the stomach, and still 
get pretty far, " said Jerry Monson, Utah County Sheriffs 
detective. 
Individuals who saw Welch collapse called for help. The suspect 
was taken to Alta View Hospital with multiple gunshot wounds. 
He was later transferred to LDS Hospital, where he underwent 
surgery. 
Adams remained at the crime scene, Harris said, and Welch's 
passenger called 911 to get help for the wounded officer. 
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Fellow officers arrived and performed CPR on him, then city 
emergency medical technicians arrived to help. 
A medical helicopter took Adams to LDS Hospital. He died a 
short time later. 
Adams had been a member of Lehi's 26-member police force 
for three years. 
For security reasons, investigators are withholding the identity 
of the passenger in the car. Sources said the passenger is 
about the same age as the suspect and from Salt Lake County. 
Monson said the passenger is not being viewed as a suspect at 
this time. 
Police say there may have been witnesses to the incident. 
Investigators want to question them, and are seeking the 
public's help. 
"There were people in proximity to the shooting who probably 
thought they did everything they needed to do and then left. 
But we still want to talk to them, " Allan said. 
Witnesses are asked to call Monson at 343-4010. 
Other Utah County officers have been wounded in the line of 
duty. Provo officer Phil Webber was wounded in a gunfight in 
the early 1990s, and in 1996, a suspect got hold of Provo 
officer Curt Middleman's service revolver in a scuffle and fired 
multiple shots. One grazed the officer's chin. 
EXHIBIT "2" 
State v. Davis, Case No. 910166-CA, Appellant Brief at 
Addendum, p. 6, lines 3, 4 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
E OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
IN LESLIE DAVIS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 910166-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Washington County 
Honorable James L. Shumate, Circuit Court Judge presiding 
ul F. Graf 
shington County Attorney 
de A. Farraway 
puty Washington County Attorney 
8 North 200 East 
George, Utah 84770 
torneys for Appellee 
J. MacArthur Wright #3564 
Dixie State Bank Building 
One South Main Street 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah Fft&D 
Attorney for Appe^r^ ^ 
^OURT OF APPEALS 
ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment, Unitei States Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of Warrant]. The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Q W 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST- GEORGE DEPARTMENT 
• * * * • 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWIN LESLIE DAVISr 
Defendant. 
SUPPRESSION HEARING 
Case No. 902005554 TC 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 27th day of 
.February ,_1991, .the above-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the Honorable James L. Shumate, Judge of the 
above-named Court, at the Washington County Courthouse, St. 
George, Utah, and that the following proceedings were had: 
APPSAPANCSS; 
For the State: WADE A. FARRAWAY, 
Deputy Washington County 
Attorney 
For the Defendant: J. MACARTHUR WRIGHT, ESQ. 
three months part-time experience as Cat 1 officer for 
Hurricane City prior to the seven months full-time. 
Q. And have you had POST training? 
A. I have, yes. 
Q. And could you explain what that training was? 
A. Basic training for 11 weeks, criminal law. 
Q. Okay. And were you so employed with your position 
with the Hurricane Police Force on December 16, 1990? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And on that occasion did you come into contact 
with one, Edwin Leslie Davis? 
A* Yes, I did. 
Q. And is Mr. Davis present in the courtroom at this 
time? 
A. Yes, he is. 
Q. Could you identify him for the record, please? 
A. Yes. He's wearing a green shirt. 
THE COURT: He has identified the defendant, 
counsel• 
Q. (By Mr. Farraway) And how did your contact with 
Mr. Davis come about? 
A. Okay. I was parked stationary on SR-9, my 
headlights were off. I seen a vehicle approaching from my 
rear, looking through my rear-view mirror. I noticed the 
headlights were on bright and it was driving very slow and 
« 
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r then it made a turn and turned off of State Road 9 into 
LeGrande Spilsbury's — the drive going into LeGrande 
Spilsbury's place. 
Q. Just — could I have you diagram how this — 
A. You bet. 
Q. You might want to use a darker color than that 
orange. 
A. Okay, I was parked about right here facing this 
•direction, and I first noticed the vehicle starting to slow 
down right here and then it turned in, it came in 
approximately, oh, Ifd have to look at my report to see 
exactly. Come in approximately 100 feet or so, and then the 
lights went off. I was kinda- concerned that early in the 
morning. I didn't know exactly what — if there was a 
problem. 
Q. What cme was this? 
A. The time.I pulled in was at 04:45, 04:44 was the 
first time I had noticed the car, about a minute we're 
11 
talkin', from the time I seen it to the time I pulled right 
in. I wasn't very far away. I then turned around and 
pulled in behind and then I noticed a passenger in the 
vehicle. The passenger's door was open. I noticed the 
i 
passenger standing outside by the rear trunk with a 
container of alcohol, beer, on the trunk of the car and the 
' passenger was urinating. 
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I immediately then thought, "Well, it might be an 
alcohol violation.n I called my dispatch, told them what I 
3 I had. I then activated my overhead, my lights, my red and 
4 blue lights, got out of my vehicle and approached the 
driver's side. Mr. Davis was in the driver's side behind 
6 I the wheel. The vehicle was off, it wasn't running, it was 
7, off. The keys were in the ignition. I then asked him if I 
Q I could see his driver's license or some identification and he 
9 told me that I didn't have the right. And I told him that I 
did and that I needed to see it. And he told me that he 
didn't have to show me a fucking thing because he was on 
12 I private property and there was nothin' I could do about it. 
13 Q. And then what happened? 
14 A. Then the passenger handed me the registration card 
15 to the vehicle. I believe it was his vehicle. Handed me 
16 the registration card across from the passenger side through 
17 I the driver's door. He didn't have his window down. He had 
his door open. He handed it to me, didn't say a word and 
was very cooperative. I got that and then I asked again if 
I could see his driver's license and he said, "Fuck you," 
and slammed the door and took off driving. 
I then went back to my car, called it into dispatch, 
turned on my siren and followed him, lights and siren, to 
where he turned in. LeGrande Spilsbury's home is right up 
here on the hill and there was like a little — some corrals 
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